Run nmap.

Review interesting findings

  • 9389/tcp – Active directory web services
  • 445/139/tcp – SMB ports lets run smbmapper
  • 80/tcp – web server – lets run dirb on it.
  • 3268/tcp – LDAP requests sent to port 3268 can be used to search for objects in the entire forest for the global catalog
  • 464/tcp – kpasswd – A vulnerability has been reported in Kerberos, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). The vulnerability is caused due to the kpasswd application not properly handling malformed UDP packets and can be exploited to exhaust CPU and network resources via the UDP “ping-pong” attack on port 464.
    References: [CVE-2002-2443], [SECUNIA-53375]
  • 389/tcp – LDAP
  • 593/tcp – MS Security Bulletin [MS03-026] outlines a critical Buffer Overrun RPC vulnerability that can be exploited via ports 135, 139, 445, 593 (or any other specifically configured RPC port). You should filter the above mentioned ports at the firewall level and not allow RPC over an unsecure network, such as the Internet.
  • 135/tcp – Remote Procedure Call (RPC) 
  • 88/tcp – KDC (Kerberos key distribution center) server.
  • 5985/tcp – WinRM 2.0 (Microsoft Windows Remote Management) uses port 5985/tcp for HTTP and 5986/tcp for HTTPS by default.

We can see many interesting ports to look at – the box seems to be LDAP/AD/Kerberos focused. We also see we get an nmap segmentation fault;

Checking the services

SMBmap doesn’t give us much to work with here.

Not much shown from dirb either, looks like a pretty flat site. We have a lot of other choices to check but lets spin up sparta to try and narrow down our options before we take the next step with the AD/LDAP/Kerberos enumeration. Lets see if it gives us alternative options.

While sparta is running we will also setup openvas on our machine using the guide here - ;

root@kali:~# apt update
root@kali:~# apt install openvas
root@kali:~# openvas-setup
kali:~# greenbone-scapdata-sync
root@kali:~# openvas-adduser
root@kali:~# gsd
[*] Creating admin user
User created with password '73a95e20-b3fd-4e77-9b6f-247a49ff695e'.

While these scans run we read up on Kerberos here; this blog leads us to an interesting attack which matches the boxes name; KerbeRoasting but we need a domain account to do this. So lets try and get one with some further enumeration.

A good amount of information, usernames, including guest. Plus the domain name. Going back to the site itself we found some usernames;

We can also see many blog posts from user Admin. Finally using cme we can find some additional information.

Vulnerability Detection Result

Here is the list of DCE/RPC or MSRPC services running on this host via the TCP protocol:
Port: 49664/tcp
     UUID: d95afe70-a6d5-4259-822e-2c84da1ddb0d, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49664]
Port: 49665/tcp
     UUID: f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49665]
     Annotation: Event log TCPIP
Port: 49666/tcp
     UUID: 3a9ef155-691d-4449-8d05-09ad57031823, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49666]
     UUID: 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49666]
Port: 49667/tcp
     UUID: 0b1c2170-5732-4e0e-8cd3-d9b16f3b84d7, version 0
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49667]
     Annotation: RemoteAccessCheck
     UUID: 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-01234567cffb, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49667]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : Netlogon
     Description : Net Logon service
     UUID: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab, version 0
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49667]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : lsass.exe
     Description : LSA access
     UUID: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49667]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : lsass.exe
     Description : SAM access
     UUID: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49667]
     Annotation: Impl friendly name
     UUID: e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2, version 4
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49667]
     Annotation: MS NT Directory DRS Interface
Port: 49673/tcp
     UUID: 0b1c2170-5732-4e0e-8cd3-d9b16f3b84d7, version 0
     Endpoint: ncacn_http:[49673]
     Annotation: RemoteAccessCheck
     UUID: 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-01234567cffb, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_http:[49673]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : Netlogon
     Description : Net Logon service
     UUID: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab, version 0
     Endpoint: ncacn_http:[49673]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : lsass.exe
     Description : LSA access
     UUID: e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2, version 4
     Endpoint: ncacn_http:[49673]
     Annotation: MS NT Directory DRS Interface
Port: 49674/tcp
     UUID: 0b1c2170-5732-4e0e-8cd3-d9b16f3b84d7, version 0
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49674]
     Annotation: RemoteAccessCheck
     UUID: 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-01234567cffb, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49674]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : Netlogon
     Description : Net Logon service
     UUID: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab, version 0
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49674]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : lsass.exe
     Description : LSA access
     UUID: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49674]
     Named pipe : lsass
     Win32 service or process : lsass.exe
     Description : SAM access
     UUID: e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2, version 4
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49674]
     Annotation: MS NT Directory DRS Interface
Port: 49675/tcp
     UUID: 0b6edbfa-4a24-4fc6-8a23-942b1eca65d1, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49675]
     UUID: 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49675]
     Named pipe : spoolss
     Win32 service or process : spoolsv.exe
     Description : Spooler service
     UUID: 4a452661-8290-4b36-8fbe-7f4093a94978, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49675]
     UUID: 76f03f96-cdfd-44fc-a22c-64950a001209, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49675]
     UUID: ae33069b-a2a8-46ee-a235-ddfd339be281, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49675]
Port: 49678/tcp
     UUID: 367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32-98f038001003, version 2
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49678]
Port: 49686/tcp
     UUID: 50abc2a4-574d-40b3-9d66-ee4fd5fba076, version 5
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49686]
     Named pipe : dnsserver
     Win32 service or process : dns.exe
     Description : DNS Server
Port: 49696/tcp
     UUID: 897e2e5f-93f3-4376-9c9c-fd2277495c27, version 1
     Endpoint: ncacn_ip_tcp:[49696]
     Annotation: Frs2 Service

CME doesn’t show us much and our OpenVAS scan hasn’t given us any vulnerabilities to exploit, though we did get additional enumeration information. But I think this is the extent of the info we will get so lets start trying to get in using and

We will need a valid user so we create a user list using cewl and edit it to include the users above, in different standard employee formats. Ever wonder why your employer doesn’t just use $Firstname.$lastname? Now you know!


Initial foothold shows we are using the wrong domain, to the glee of a friend who is getting into the habit of saying stop being stooopid.

Interestingly it looks like fsmith is a user and we now have there hash. Bouncing back to the blogs we are able to move along this chain to crack this hash. Using hashcat we run;

hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 hashes.asreproast /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

With that we have the password and the SPN for

ServicePrincipalName                      Name    MemberOf  PasswordLastSet             LastLogon  Delegation 
----------------------------------------  ------  --------  --------------------------  ---------  ----------
SAUNA/HSmith.EGOTISTICALBANK.LOCAL:60111  HSmith            2020-01-23 00:54:34.140321  <never>               

HSmith is showing instead of fsmith interestingly. I need to read up more on SPNs though it probably wont be needed for this box. Microsoft has some good documentation here;

A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.

It looks like hsmith will be the service account we will be targeting. Initially we were getting an error when trying to run this command “[-] SPN:  – Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)” but after doing an ntpupdate we fixed this. Running the command above again we get the hash and now we just need to.. ah roast it.

We crack it successfully but the password is Thestrokes23.. same as for fsmith, maybe this was a false positive. Lets log in.

Looks like we can smb login as hsmith and fsmith.

We see a RICOH printer drive which is interesting but there doesnt seem to be any vulnerabilities we can use. Going back over the nmap results we see winrm running on this server on its default port, so lets try Evil-Winrm to see if we can get a shell with these users. We use this guide to setup Evil-Winrm –

Bingo! We have access for FSmith, but we cant access winrm from hsmith. So lets try some enumeration to get root, bloodhound might be good here. Using ireds tutorial we setup bloodhound;

While this is being set up we enumerate some more.

 We can see a svc account is available.. we will try to kerberoast it.

Doesn’t work so let enumerate some more;

Some good information. We alse run these commands from C:\

findstr /si password *.txt
findstr /si password *.xml
findstr /si password *.ini

We get a lot of results but nothing seems relevant. After a while we find a blog with additional enumeration steps; ;

I am not associated with but I owe her so many beers by now.

DefaultUserName    REG_SZ    EGOTISTICALBANK\svc_loanmanager
DefaultPassword    REG_SZ    Moneymakestheworldgoround!

We now have User 1, and User 2 but how do we get root… Lets go over our enumeration with impactet and these new user credentials.

We have a ticket granting ticket. Lets kerberoast the service account incase we get something new. But we don’t.

Sadly this isn’t helping us. So lets go back to enumeration, we have a domain account so let use bloodhound to enumeration all things AD;

Going through the information generated we see Unconstrained delegation is enabled, allowing for this attack; this might help us. Unfortunately it doesn’t.

But the information from just FSmiths account is limited, so lets login as svc_loanmgr and see what information we get.

After spending some time navigating bloodhound, as nice as having a gui is for the point-click admins, I hate it – but after much searching, blood, sweat and sanity I finally see that svc_loanmgr has both getchanges and getchangesall privileges allowing for a DCSync attack.

We will attack it using the impacket tool, described in the blog (sent our way by a friend who stops us being stoopid).

From here we just need to use the hash with evil-rm as administrator to get the flag.

Game set and match, but in saying that I was working on this on-off for about 4 days before it clicked, strangely it was the seeing the vulnerability in bloodhound that I had the most trouble with, which if you go by the comments in the HTB forums was the easy bit! 😀

Such is life.

Hack The Box – Postman

Run Nmap

Shows a few ports we can play with including http so lets dirb it.

Dirb the website

Its interesting, the js scripts might have an exec we can use but not sure. Lets run a full nmap to see what info we can get on OS and versions.

Full nmap

The verbose nmap shows some extra info including; OpenSSH, Apache httpd 2.4.29, MiniServ 1.910 (Webmin httpd) and ubuntu.

Lets google these versions for exploits as it might be easier than manipulating the js, if that’s possible.

The google

Interesting we seem to see 2 exploits that might be useful.

For Webmin (CVE-2019-12840)

This is interesting and might be useful if we can get the webmin credentials.

For Apache –

Interesting as well, might be how we get root but not the door we are looking for.

Webmin enum

So lets checkout webmin first.

Researching webmin vulnerabilities we see could potentially let us change the password. We know the device is linux so the default username is root. Lets see if we can change the password.

Nope. Researching the Apache version also didn’t do much good. When speaking to a friend I am told I am an idiot and lazy with nmap, and I should redo my nmap and not be stooopid. As such I am now redoing nmap with sadness in my heart.

Sure enough we see port 6379 – Redis Key-Value Store 4.0.9. Abit of research shows Redis to be a mix of nosql and caching software that, as it says, acts as a key value store. Guessing our user credentials are stored in it so after installing redis-cli we can connect to the box;

Using HackTricks site we are able to learn about more about redis and how to enumerate it;

Using CONFIG GET * we can see the configuration;> CONFIG GET *
  1) "dbfilename"
  2) "authorized_keys"
  3) "requirepass"
  4) ""
  5) "masterauth"
  6) ""
  7) "cluster-announce-ip"
  8) ""
  9) "unixsocket"
 10) ""
 11) "logfile"
 12) "/var/log/redis/redis-server.log"
 13) "pidfile"
 14) "/var/run/redis/"
 15) "slave-announce-ip"
 16) ""
 17) "maxmemory"
 18) "0"
 19) "proto-max-bulk-len"
 20) "536870912"
 21) "client-query-buffer-limit"
 22) "1073741824"
 23) "maxmemory-samples"
 24) "5"
 25) "lfu-log-factor"
 26) "10"
 27) "lfu-decay-time"
 28) "1"
 29) "timeout"
 30) "0"
 31) "active-defrag-threshold-lower"
 32) "10"
 33) "active-defrag-threshold-upper"
 34) "100"
 35) "active-defrag-ignore-bytes"
 36) "104857600"
 37) "active-defrag-cycle-min"
 38) "25"
 39) "active-defrag-cycle-max"
 40) "75"
 41) "auto-aof-rewrite-percentage"
 42) "100"
 43) "auto-aof-rewrite-min-size"
 44) "67108864"
 45) "hash-max-ziplist-entries"
 46) "512"
 47) "hash-max-ziplist-value"
 48) "64"
 49) "list-max-ziplist-size"
 50) "-2"
 51) "list-compress-depth"
 52) "0"
 53) "set-max-intset-entries"
 54) "512"
 55) "zset-max-ziplist-entries"
 56) "128"
 57) "zset-max-ziplist-value"
 58) "64"
 59) "hll-sparse-max-bytes"
 60) "3000"
 61) "lua-time-limit"
 62) "5000"
 63) "slowlog-log-slower-than"
 64) "10000"
 65) "latency-monitor-threshold"
 66) "0"
 67) "slowlog-max-len"
 68) "128"
 69) "port"
 70) "6379"
 71) "cluster-announce-port"
 72) "0"
 73) "cluster-announce-bus-port"
 74) "0"
 75) "tcp-backlog"
 76) "511"
 77) "databases"
 78) "16"
 79) "repl-ping-slave-period"
 80) "10"
 81) "repl-timeout"
 82) "60"
 83) "repl-backlog-size"
 84) "1048576"
 85) "repl-backlog-ttl"
 86) "3600"
 87) "maxclients"
 88) "10000"
 89) "watchdog-period"
 90) "0"
 91) "slave-priority"
 92) "100"
 93) "slave-announce-port"
 94) "0"
 95) "min-slaves-to-write"
 96) "0"
 97) "min-slaves-max-lag"
 98) "10"
 99) "hz"
100) "10"
101) "cluster-node-timeout"
102) "15000"
103) "cluster-migration-barrier"
104) "1"
105) "cluster-slave-validity-factor"
106) "10"
107) "repl-diskless-sync-delay"
108) "5"
109) "tcp-keepalive"
110) "300"
111) "cluster-require-full-coverage"
112) "yes"
113) "cluster-slave-no-failover"
114) "no"
115) "no-appendfsync-on-rewrite"
116) "no"
117) "slave-serve-stale-data"
118) "yes"
119) "slave-read-only"
120) "yes"
121) "stop-writes-on-bgsave-error"
122) "yes"
123) "daemonize"
124) "yes"
125) "rdbcompression"
126) "yes"
127) "rdbchecksum"
128) "yes"
129) "activerehashing"
130) "yes"
131) "activedefrag"
132) "no"
133) "protected-mode"
134) "no"
135) "repl-disable-tcp-nodelay"
136) "no"
137) "repl-diskless-sync"
138) "no"
139) "aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync"
140) "yes"
141) "aof-load-truncated"
142) "yes"
143) "aof-use-rdb-preamble"
144) "no"
145) "lazyfree-lazy-eviction"
146) "no"
147) "lazyfree-lazy-expire"
148) "no"
149) "lazyfree-lazy-server-del"
150) "no"
151) "slave-lazy-flush"
152) "no"
153) "maxmemory-policy"
154) "noeviction"
155) "loglevel"
156) "notice"
157) "supervised"
158) "no"
159) "appendfsync"
160) "everysec"
161) "syslog-facility"
162) "local0"
163) "appendonly"
164) "no"
165) "dir"
166) "/var/lib/redis/.ssh"
167) "save"
168) "900 1 300 10 60 10000"
169) "client-output-buffer-limit"
170) "normal 0 0 0 slave 268435456 67108864 60 pubsub 33554432 8388608 60"
171) "unixsocketperm"
172) "0"
173) "slaveof"
174) ""
175) "notify-keyspace-events"
176) ""
177) "bind"
178) " ::1"

We learn abit about the config file locations, the DB filename and that protected mode(whatever that is) is not enabled.. not much I can think of using so lets try the next command HackTricks suggests;

Looks like we will be able to get the public ssh_key for the user, red. After some more research we come to this blog; shows how we can use protected mode being disabled to upload our own trusted public key. As per that blog we create temp.txt and upload it to redis.

We can see our key s-key. Next what we want to do with our uploaded ssh key is to get it into the authorized keys file and save it, this way we should be able to ssh.

We don’t have permission to write the authorized_key to the user, reds .ssh folder so let’s try it in the default /var/lib/redis/.ssh. Now trying to SSH as Root, Red and Redis doesn’t seem to work. Let’s try again incase we did something incorrect, this time I will do it as root, just incase there is some unlikely permission issue. We run a flushall command in redis-cli to clear everything and begin again.
This time it seems to work, guessing I typo’d the DIR, or misspelled the auth_keys 😕 Who doesn’t love life..

So now we are logged into the system as Redis, we can view one other user on the system, /home/Matt and the user key is there but unreadable as Redis. The user Red seems to be a red haring. So now we will go through the system to see what we can see.

Checking through the bash history for redis we can see and sshd_config and id_rsa.bak. Lets check these out first. Sshd_config didn’t show anything interesting but we were able to find a passphrase protected id_rsa.bak file in /opt;

googling how to enumerate id_rsa files shows us we might be able to get a password from this file; We copy/paste the file contents into a file on our kali machine, setup john the ripper and.. ah… let ‘er rip!

Computer2008 seems to be our pass, so lets su into Matt and grab that user key.

Everythings coming up matthouse! So now we have user how will we get root. We know we have webmin and redis on the machine so are there any privilege escalations that will help? Checking running processes we can see webmin is being run as root so that might be a good start for checking;

Cant read most of the webmin files but we can confirm the version and search sploit shows one option for us.

And this is in MSF, we can be lazy. MSF module shows we need the webmin password to exploit. Lets see if Matt/computer2008 lets is log into it.

It does, we are in! 😊

Now we run and… we are in!

Lets see if we can get root flag now.

And we win! 😊

HTB – NetMon

As always first step is to run nmap and see what we find.

kali@kali:~$ sudo nmap -v -A -O
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( ) at 2020-03-08 07:02 EDT
NSE: Loaded 151 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
Initiating NSE at 07:02
Completed NSE at 07:02, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 07:02
Completed NSE at 07:02, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 07:02
Completed NSE at 07:02, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Ping Scan at 07:02
Scanning [4 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 07:02, 0.08s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 07:02
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 07:02, 0.01s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 07:02
Scanning [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 21/tcp on
Discovered open port 445/tcp on
Discovered open port 135/tcp on
Discovered open port 139/tcp on
Increasing send delay for from 0 to 5 due to 113 out of 376 dropped probes since last increase.
Increasing send delay for from 5 to 10 due to max_successful_tryno increase to 4
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 07:02, 25.20s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 07:02
Scanning 4 services on
Completed Service scan at 07:02, 6.57s elapsed (4 services on 1 host)
Initiating OS detection (try #1) against
Retrying OS detection (try #2) against
Retrying OS detection (try #3) against
Retrying OS detection (try #4) against
Retrying OS detection (try #5) against
Initiating Traceroute at 07:03
Completed Traceroute at 07:03, 0.03s elapsed
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 2 hosts. at 07:03
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 2 hosts. at 07:03, 0.01s elapsed
NSE: Script scanning
Initiating NSE at 07:03
NSE: [ftp-bounce] PORT response: 501 Server cannot accept argument.
Completed NSE at 07:03, 8.26s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 07:03
Completed NSE at 07:03, 0.08s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 07:03
Completed NSE at 07:03, 0.00s elapsed
Nmap scan report for
Host is up (0.13s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed ports
21/tcp  open  ftp          Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-syst: 
|_  SYST: Windows_NT
135/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open  microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012 microsoft-ds
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see ).
TCP/IP fingerprint:

Uptime guess: 0.001 days (since Sun Mar  8 07:01:37 2020)
Network Distance: 2 hops
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=258 (Good luck!)
IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: 2m03s, deviation: 0s, median: 2m03s
|_smb-os-discovery: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
| smb-security-mode: 
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   2.02: 
|_    Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2020-03-08T11:05:18
|_  start_date: 2020-03-08T11:03:54

TRACEROUTE (using port 256/tcp)
1   30.47 ms
2   30.59 ms

NSE: Script Post-scanning.
Initiating NSE at 07:03
Completed NSE at 07:03, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 07:03
Completed NSE at 07:03, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 07:03
Completed NSE at 07:03, 0.00s elapsed
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 53.31 seconds
           Raw packets sent: 2006 (91.810KB) | Rcvd: 1265 (54.086KB)

We see FTP, SMB, NetBios and RPC ports open.. lets try enumerating what we can find in FTP first. Lets spin up MSF and search what FTP options we have.

We see alot of ways to play around with FTP, but first we want to check for guest, anonymous and no password logins. First check shows anonymous is allowed, lets see what we can see. As part of researching i found this nice blog;

Using scanner/ftp/anonymous we cab see that anonymous logins are allowed, so lets log in and see what we can see.

lucky day – looks like the whole C drive is available; everything from program files to users – lets see if we can get both flags.. we can get the user flag easily.

Lets see if we can also get admin. If blue was easy maybe this will be too.

Boo we cant. lets check out the other directories.

Not much interesting to find (dont forget to escape your spaces!) PRTG is the only program – which ties into the netmon name so lets google this. Its an interesting monitoring tool ive used before but not sure how we can use this to get admin; lets check version and see what vulns show. Lets first try playing around with the website.

After about too many tears shed from searching the FTP drive and the website I still cant find anything interesting. Lets try the web app.. DIRB and a manual search dont give anything i can use, common accounts arnt recognised.. back to google. i got this blog looks like program data might give us something

ProgramData.. hidden folders shouldent be forgotten about. 🙂 Going through the folder we see a .dat, .old and .old.bak config files. lets pull down the 3 config files and see whats in them

We have the version from .dat file; the config itself is very long with most setting seem unimportant, and searching through “user” doesn’t give any results. Lets see if we can find any vulnerabilities for that version.

Found a few CVE’s, CVE-2018-19203, CVE-2018-19204 and CVE-2018-9276 but nothing that we can use.

Success? After being stumped for awhile i was going through the .bak.old I found something – never forget to search for admin in all files 😮

                  PRTG System Administrator
                  <cell col="0" crypt="PRTG">
                  <cell col="1" crypt="PRTG">
            <!-- User: prtgadmin -->

Lets see if we can log into the website with these credentials…

suspenseful pause and it fails. Checking the other config files for this we find that the DBPassword is now set to encrypt and inherit, nice and secure 😦 .. not in plain text anymore. After playing around i noticed the .dat file has a saved date of 2019, and changing the year in the password to 2019 lets us log in!

Now that we are logged into the app we can use one of the CVE’s we found earlier. Started trying the OS command injection CVE-2018-19204.. but there was no MSF module and I wasnt able to find a working PoC to use it but while searching a few more articles referenced CVE-2018-9276 which might work and has a python script prebuild; so lets give this a go.

After some playing around the python script wasnt working so i ended up using exploitdb’s bash script instead; .

With this we have created an admin user account on the system itself so lets try to login. Reading up on we can try using PSexec to get a shell.

And we are in as admin! The flag has been found in the Admins users desktop! 🙂

HTB – Blue

First blog in a long time wanted to do something fast to get back into it – I want to start doing more HTB this year and using a quick and dirty walk-through lets me get two birds with one stone!


  1. Run Nmap scan

We see 445 smb! With a name like blue i wonder what smb vulnerability could be our target.. 🙂

2. MSF
Spin up msf and search for smb to see what options we have.

smb_version looks like a good start.

SMB_Version is a good starting point to see what SMB tells us about the host, we can then cross check that with ExploitDB or something similar to see what vulnerabilities are present

With SMB running on Windows 7 SP1 we should have all we need.


Lets check vulnerabilities for that Windows version – I am specifically looking to see if its vulnerable to eternal blue;

Wonderful! Its vulnerable. lets exploit it. We could use ExploitDB’s script; but lets be lazy and see what MSF has for us by searching for eternal blue, or for MS17-010.

We can see there are several pre-made payloads for eternal blue and one interesting result, but not for this box, is the doublepulsar RCE payload.. Wannacry leveraged that.. the memories :’) but for now we will use Exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue.

Using this we are able to get a shell and it shows we are running as system! Looks like there will only one stage for finding flags with this box. Checking Users we see haris and Admin, both flags were found in the respective users Desktop.

And with that we have our flags. Easy box but good for beginners!

What is incident response?

not all incidents can be prevented. An incident response capability is therefore necessary for rapidly detecting incidents, minimizing loss and destruction, mitigating the weaknesses that were exploited, and restoring IT services

Incident response(or IR) is the portion of our security where we have to deal with, or respond, to adverse events that threaten security. While Business Continuity Planning can deal with outages caused by natural disasters, mechanical failures or similar events that can impact the business from performing; IR deals with events that impact the security of the organisation. Because performing incident response effectively is a complex undertaking, establishing a successful incident response capability requires substantial planning and resources. One of the best resources we can use are SANS Digital Forensics and Incident Response resources and the NIST 800-61r2 guidelines. The NIST guidelines would have provided the bulk of the research for this post as i went through it, understood it and simplify it here for easy reference. The full guidelines are here.

Before we go into IR lets go back to ITIL and the difference between an event and an incident. An event is any observable occurrence in a system or network. Events include a user connecting to a file share, a server receiving a request for a web page, a user sending email, and a firewall blocking a connection attempt. Adverse events are events with a negative consequence, such as system crashes, packet floods, unauthorised use of system privileges, unauthorised access to sensitive data, and execution of malware that destroys data. This guide addresses only adverse events that are computer security related, not those caused by natural disasters, power failures, etc. A computer security incident is a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.

Types of incidents

There are several different types of incidents we can look at depending on what their goal is and how they are carried out. These can include;

  • Confidentiality
  • Integrity
  • Availability
  • Reconnaissance
  • Repudiation
  • Harassment
  • Extortion
  • Hoaxes

Why do we need IR?

Having an incident response function becomes ever more vital as our society becomes more connected. With the exponentially growing amount of publicly known security vulnerabilities for all types of technology and the increasingly connected and interconnected organisation’s around the world, criminals have plenty of ways to attack your systems. Added to the amount of information and intellectual property companies store on their systems, the transactions and analytics carried out and the technical links between businesses across the supply chain, there are many ways a criminal or state organisation can benefit from compromising your networks. The regulatory, financial, reputational and productivity impacts could be catastrophic. The benefits of having Incident Response capabilities include;

  • reduce the frequency of incidents by effectively securing networks, systems, and applications.
  • communications often need to occur quickly, organisations should define communication guidelines so that the appropriate information is shared with the appropriate parties.
  • Allowing more prioritised preparations for handling incidents by focusing on being incidents that use common attack vectors.
    • External/Removable Media: An attack executed from removable media (e.g., flash drive, CD) or a peripheral device. Attrition: An attack that employs brute force methods to compromise, degrade, or destroy systems, networks, or services. Web: An attack executed from a website or web-based application. Email: An attack executed via an email message or attachment. Improper Usage: Any incident resulting from violation of an organisation’s acceptable usage policies by an authorised user, excluding the above categories. Loss or Theft of Equipment: The loss or theft of a computing device or media used by the organisation, such as a laptop or smartphone. Other: An attack that does not fit into any of the other categories.
  • By emphasising the importance of incident detection and analysis throughout the organisation we can make sure unusual activities are investigated faster.
  • Written guidelines for prioritising incidents reducing confusion and time lost during an incident while allowing for more effective resource allocation.
  • Using the lessons learned process we gain value from incidents allowing us to iteratively improve our security.

So whats needed for establishing our incident response capability? In general our organisation should take a policy based approach to all aspects of information security to make us a well oiled machine! We can see this approach when we have high level description of the essential elements of information security, an understanding from users and system administrators about what they can and cannot do, and sanctions for infractions. We have this approach as it improves security by having everybody aware of what they must do and how they must do it. Incident response is no different and at a minimum it should include the following actions:

  • Creating an incident response policy and plan
  • Developing procedures for performing incident handling and reporting
  • Setting guidelines for communicating with outside parties regarding incidents
  • Selecting a team structure for an incident.
  • Establishing relationships and lines of communication between the incident response team and other groups, both internal (legal department) and external (law enforcement agencies)
  • Determining what services the incident response team should provide.
  • Staffing and training for the incident response team

Incident Response process

There are 6 steps in the standard SANS Incident Response process.

SANS Incident Response Process

Phase 1: Preparation.

Preparation phase comes before we have identified an attack. It is the stage where we start layering or defences and security controls to reduce the risk of a(successful) attack and where we start getting our policies and procedures created and distributed. Having all our staff trained up in what to do in an incident and ensuring any tools or infrastructure our incident response activity relies on are present and available is essential.

Phase 2: Identification.

At this point we have our Intrusion Detection, SIEM and other detective controls which will identify any attack taking place on your system. Here is where our analysts take in offences/tickets and investigate them to distinguish between false positives and legitimate incidents.

Phase 3: Containment.

If we reach this phase than an active attack is occurring. Before eradicating the attack and beginning our recovery we must stop it from spreading further throughout our estate. There are several strategies we can follow but whichever we apply we must be sure to keep a record of any actions taken. The strategies include;

  • Shutting down a system
  • Disconnect the infected asset from the network
  • Change filtering rules of firewalls
  • Disabling or deleting compromised accounts
  • Increasing monitoring levels
  • Setting traps such as honeypot
  • Striking back at the attacker’s system

Phase 4: Eradication.

At this point the attack is no longer spreading and we have an idea of the cause of the incident. We now proceed to eradicate that cause, for example eliminating the virus or worm. At this stage procedures are very important to ensure the eradication is completed as expected.

Phase 5: Recovery.

At this stage our goal is to return the compromised systems to their normal state. We should have recovery procedures in place tailored to potential incidents but the safest is a full rebuild of systems and restoring data from the last backup. Dont forget to patch impacted machines and again it is important to keep a record of any action taken and to keep users aware of the recovery status. This communication reduces confusion and rumours and allows us to advise them of major developments that may impact them. Adhering to local laws and internal policies in relation to media contact should also be considered with key employees being assigned this responsibility.

Phase 6: Lessons Learned.

The lessons learned phase is usually neglected but a post-mortem can be improvement to help us gain an exact understanding of the incident, its time line and the adequacy of our response. We can see what procedures worked and what did not, what the damage was and what we need to change going forward. This allows us to continually improve what we do and how we do it.


So how do we view our incident response as being successful? Good security should mean no incidents but everybody will suffer a breach at some point. So how do we measure success then? There are a few metrics we can use including;

  • Number of incidents,
  • Estimated financial loss – the more effective we are at incident response the less loss we will incur,
  • After each incident our lessons learned phase should include honest self evaluation,
  • Average time and resource required per incident,
  • Documentation and procedure quality by team.

We will always suffer incidents but by having a solid methodology and procedures to guide us when it happens we can be in a better place to reduce the damage caused to us. It can take time for the teams involved to get comfortable with the process so war gaming and mock events can be vital to improving our efficiency. With this in place from Preparation through to Lessons Learned attackers will have a much harder time breaking through our defences and maintaining persistence.